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DISCLOSURE STATEMENT 
 Neither CatholicVote.org nor Fidelis Center are public corporations and no 
one holds stock therein.  Counsel is a private attorney who has no affiliation with 
the parties to the case or any financial interest other than that common to all 
taxpayers.    
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Interest of The Amicus Curiae 
Fidelis Center For Law & Policy (“Fidelis”) is a not-for-profit public interest 
organization that submits this brief on behalf of those who support 
CatholicVote.org, a nonpartisan voter education program devoted to building a 
Culture-of-Life.  Members of CatholicVote.org seek to serve their country by 
supporting educational activities designed to promote an authentic understanding 
of ordered liberty and the common good as seen in light of the Roman Catholic 
religious tradition.  Committed in principle to the primacy of individual liberty and 
the importance of private charity as well as the importance of federalism and the 
doctrine of subsidiarity, CatholicVote.org believes that the Patient Protection and 
Affordable Care Act is a pernicious expansion of federal power which undermines 
those fundamental values.   
Pursuant to Rule 29, counsel affirms that no party has authored any part of 
this brief, although both parties kindly consented to its filing, and no person other 
than those excluded by Rule 29(c)(5)(C) contributed to its preparation.  Counsel 
conferred with other amicus curiae who agreed that the themes of this brief were 
analytically distinct and should be treated separately in service of orderly 
presentation of argument to this Court. 
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SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
 The eleven challenges to the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act 
(“PPACA), now progressing through the federal courts leave little doubt that the 
PPACA is the most recent illustration of the prescient observation that while 
“[t]his [federal] government is acknowledged by all to be one of enumerated 
powers….the question respecting the extent of powers actually granted, is 
perpetually arising, and will continue to arise, so long as our system exits.”  
McCullough v. Maryland, 17 U.S. 316, 320 (1819).  The amicus seeks to assist this 
Court‟s effort to properly delineate the scope of federal power in the federal system 
by placing the claims made for the constitutionality of the PPACA in the context 
created by three distinct lines of precedent.   
 We respectfully suggest that the decision below is wrong because it rests 
upon arguments that simply cannot be squared with precedent from disparate areas 
that shed light on the proper resolution of this case.  More specifically, we submit 
that the arguments made for PPACA are at odds with three areas of precedent not 
raised by the parties or other amici curiae.  The court below held that Congress 
could regulate mental activity under the commerce power, but it is fundamental 
that the First Amendment prohibits the federal government from regulating beliefs.  
The court below upheld PPACA based on its assumption that uninsured persons 
would need medical care at some point but be unable to pay for it, yet it is 
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fundamental that the government cannot allocate benefits or burdens based upon 
arbitrary and irrebuttable presumptions of this kind.  The court below upheld 
PPACA on the theory that inactivity amounted to commercial activity, neglecting 
precedent indicating that Due Process protects liberty by preventing the exercise of 
jurisdiction without an element of “purposeful availment.”  We respectfully 
suggest that precedent in these three areas provides a telling indication that 
Congress exceeded its authority when it enacted the PPACA. 
I. The Arguments Made For The PPACA’s Individual Mandate Defy 
Well Recognized Liberty Interests Protected By The Constitution.  
 
 The court below held the PPACA constitutional based on four related 
findings.  It found the following: (1) Congress can regulate an individual‟s mental 
activity, more specifically the decision to purchase health insurance (or not) 
because the mental activity substantially affects interstate commerce; (2) all 
individuals will use health care at some point in their lives and Congress can 
regulate the health care industry; (3) some uninsured individuals will receive health 
care services that they will be unable to pay for, resulting in costs that will be 
shifted to others; and (4) the legal requirement that individuals purchase insurance 
is necessary to ensure that the PPACA does not have negative consequences.  JA 
140-57.  The difficulty of squaring the claims made for the PPACA with precedent 
from varied areas of the law compels the conclusion that the claims made for 
constitutionality of the PPACA must be rejected.   
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A. The Beliefs Of Its Citizens Provide No Basis For Governmental 
Regulation. 
 
 The court below held that the mental activity involved in whether to 
purchase health care is mental activity that can be regulated by Congress.  JA 140-
41.   The decision below is inconsistent with longstanding precedent from this 
court under the First Amendment.  As long ago as Cantwell v. Connecticut, the 
Supreme Court held that the First Amendment “embraces two concepts – freedom 
to believe and freedom to act.  The first is absolute ….”  310 U.S. 296 (1940). The 
court has recognized that because the First Amendment recognizes a “freedom to 
believe,” laws that infringe upon that freedom are per se unconstitutional. Torcaso 
v. Watkins, 367 U.S. 488, 492-493 (1961).  The freedom of belief is extremely 
broad, „no official … can prescribe what shall be orthodox in politics, nationalism, 
religion, or other matters or opinion or force citizens to confess by word or act 
their faith therein.”  West Virginia State Bd. of Education v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 
624, 642 (1943).    Indeed, the Court has gone so far as to say that in order to 
regulate belief, it must be shown that the act of “remaining passive … created a 
clear and present danger….”.  Barnette, 319 U.S. at 633.  
 The First Amendment provides the same protection where, as in this case, a 
decision is informed by religious belief.  The Free Exercise Clause categorically 
prohibits government from regulating, prohibiting, or rewarding religious beliefs.  
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Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 402 (1963); Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. at 
642; McDaniel v. Paty, 435 U.S. 618, 626 (1978). A burden upon religion exists 
where a state puts substantial pressure on an adherent to modify his behavior and 
violate his beliefs.  Bowen v. Roy, 476 U.S. 693, 727 (1986), citing Thomas v. 
Review Bd. of Indiana Employment Security Div., 450 U.S. 707, 717-718 (1981).  
 The decision below flies in the face of this precedent.  The plaintiffs-
appellants are individuals who believe the purchase of insurance is unnecessary for 
reasons that are their own, whether rooted in religious convictions or personal 
views as to the necessity and desirability of purchasing insurance.  It speaks 
volumes that the Court below had to go so far as to find that Congress can regulate 
mental activity in order to find PPACA represented a constitutional exercise of the 
power to regulate commerce among the several states.  That such a farfetched 
conclusion defies the longstanding notion that Congress cannot regulate belief 
provides one of several indications that the court below reached too far.   
B. Due Process Prevents Government From Regulating Based On 
Arbitrary And Irrebuttable Presumptions. 
 
In order to find the PPACA constitutional the court below had to hold that 
(1) all individuals will use health care at some point in their lives and Congress can 
regulate the health care industry; and (2) some uninsured individuals will receive 
health care services that they will be unable to pay for, resulting in costs that will 
be shifted to others.  JA 140-57.   
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The Supreme Court has consistently rejected the very sort of arbitrary and 
irrebuttable presumption relied upon to justify the individual mandate.  
Significantly, the Court has rejected such arbitrary and irrebuttable presumptions 
when used in connection with the taxing power.  Allegheny Pittsburgh Coal Co. v. 
County Commission of Webster County, 488 U.S. 336 (1989)(Assessment practice 
which effectively limited meaningful valuation adjustments to transfer of property 
thereby creating arbitrary disparities in tax burdens violated equal protection); 
Williams v. Vermont, 472 U.S. 14 (1985)(Regulation that allowed Vermont 
residents registering vehicle to reduce use tax by a credit in amount of use or sales 
tax paid to another state if person was Vermont resident at time of vehicle was 
purchased but denying credit to Vermont residents if they were not Vermont 
residents at time vehicle was purchased created an arbitrary classification that 
violated due process); Hooper v. Bernalillo County, 472 U.S. 612 (1985)(Statute 
granting tax exemption to Vietnam veterans who resided in the state before May 8, 
1976 violated equal protection because it was plainly designed to favor residents 
before that date over newcomers); Heiner v. Donnan, 285 U.S. 312, 329 
(1932)(statute creating conclusive presumption that gifts made within two years 
prior to the donor's death were made in contemplation of death was so arbitrary 
and unreasonable as to deprive the taxpayer of his property without due process of 
law.).  
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These case rejecting presumptions when used in connection with the taxing 
power are part of a larger body of case law that shares the same thrust.  The Court 
has consistently struck down arbitrary and capricious classifications that burden a 
group of citizens based on gross generalizations or conclusive presumptions of the 
kind at issue here.  See e.g. Cleveland Board of Ed v. LaFluer, 414 U.S. 632 
(1974)(Regulations requiring teachers to take leave four to five months before due 
date of child violated due process because arbitrary periods did not consistently 
serve to ensure stated goal of preserving continuity in instruction and swept too 
broadly by creating a conclusive presumption that teacher would not be fit to teach; 
requirement of three month delay before return to work after birth violated due 
process because it created an irrebuttable presumption that mother was not fit to 
return to work);  Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494 (1977)(zoning 
ordinance which barred grandchild from living with the grandmother while 
allowing other relatives to live together was an arbitrary interference with family 
life); City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, 473 U.S. 432 (1985)(City 
ordinance requiring special use permit for proposed group home for mentally 
retarded but not other similarly situated uses violated equal protection given lack 
of rational basis for stated belief that group home posed special threat to legitimate 
interests); Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620 (1996)(Amendment which placed in a 
solitary class of citizens defined with reference to sexual practices or orientation at 
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a disadvantage with respect to transactions and relations in both the private and 
governmental sphere violated equal protection because it imposed a broad and 
undifferentiated disability on a single named group amounting to a special 
disability upon those groups alone).  And the Court also has struck down arbitrary 
and capricious classifications creating preferences relating to government benefits.  
See e.g. Zobel v. Williams, 457 U.S. 55 (1982)(Program distributing revenue 
dividends to residents based on duration of residency violated equal protection 
because goal of classification was to provide greater benefit to those who had 
resided longer in the State.). 
Taken together these cases recognize that classifications based on arbitrary 
and conclusive presumptions resting upon gross generalizations violate Due 
Process because they fail to exhibit sufficient respect for individual liberty.  
Significantly, in each of these cases the Supreme Court invalidated the arbitrary 
and capricious presumptions without resort to any heightened level of scrutiny 
precisely because the classifications were plainly based upon arbitrary preferences 
or created conclusive presumptions based on gross generalizations.  
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The court below reached too far when it upheld the constitutionality of the 
individual mandate based upon the set of assumptions noted above.  As one district 
court has pointed out, the chain of assertions offered in support of the individual 
mandate employed can be accurately summarized as follows: 
The uninsured can only be said to have a substantial effect on 
interstate commerce in the manner as described by defendants: (i) if 
they get sick or injured; (ii) if they are still uninsured at that specific 
point in time; (iii) if they seek medical care for that sickness or injury; 
(iv) if they are unable to pay for the medical care received; and (v) if 
they are unable or unwilling to make payment arrangements directly 
with the health care provider, or with assistance of family, friends, and 
charitable; and the costs are thereafter shifted to others. 
 
Florida v. U.S. Dep’t Health & Human Servs., 2011 U.S.Dist. LEXIS 8822, at 
*92-95 (N.D. Fla. 2011).   To unpack the chain of assumptions that undergirds this 
farfetched justification for the individual mandate is to demonstrate that it is 
nothing more than an arbitrary and irrebuttable presumption which results in a 
penalty.  The Supreme Court has struck down similarly arbitrary and gross 
presumptions as inconsistent with Due Process.  Accordingly, the individual 
mandate is unconstitutional and the court below erred when it held to the contrary.   
C. Due Process Protects The Liberty Of Citizens To Avoid 
Jurisdiction By Choosing Not To Engage In Commercial Activity.   
 The court below combined its notion that the federal government could 
regulate mental activity with its embrace of an arbitrary and irrebuttable statutory 
presumption in order to reach an ultimate conclusion that brought uninsured 
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Americans within the scope of federal jurisdiction exercised under pursuant to the 
Commerce Clause.  The conclusion reached by the court below is just as farfetched 
as its premises.  For in other areas the Supreme Court has indicated that the 
guarantee of fundamental fairness at the heart of the Due Process Clause entails 
some ability to avoid jurisdiction by refraining from activity that brings one within 
the scope of a jurisdictional provision such as the commerce power.   
 For example, at the outset of the modern jurisprudence governing personal 
jurisdiction, the Supreme Court rejected a rule based on nothing more than 
physical presence when it held, in International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 
310 (1945), that exercising jurisdiction over a defendant was permissible only if 
the defendant had “certain minimum contacts with [the forum state] such that 
maintenance of the suit does not offend „traditional notions of fair play and 
substantial justice.‟” Id. at 316. At the very outset it emphasized that vitally 
important function of the “purposeful availment” requirement is to “allow [] 
potential defendants to structure their primary conduct with some minimum 
assurance as to where that conduct will and will not render them liable to suit.” 
World-Wide Volkswagen, 444 U.S. at 297.  
 The decision below is wholly inconsistent with the idea that Due Process 
entails some liberty to avoid jurisdiction.  Instead it extends the reach of 
congressional power under the Commerce Clause to a truly unprecedented extent, 
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reasoning that Congress may regulate mental activity so as to justify a finding that 
Congress can regulate noncommercial inactivity.  The Supreme Court has never 
suggested that such inactivity falls within the scope of the commerce power, and as 
the plaintiffs-appellants demonstrate, it has held to the contrary.  The idea that the 
commerce clause does not allow Congress to regulate noncommercial inactivity is 
in keeping with the Supreme Court‟s jurisprudence in the area of personal 
jurisdiction, which has indicated that one fundamental element of liberty is the 
ability of citizens to structure their voluntary activity in a way that avoids 
jurisdiction and penalty, the very results compelled by the PPACA for those who 
chose not to participate in the marketplace for healthcare insurance.  For just this 
reason, the Supreme Court‟s Due Process precedent suggests that Congress cannot 
draw citizens within the regulatory net created by the PPACA.   
  
USCA Case #11-5047      Document #1309833      Filed: 05/25/2011      Page 15 of 19
11 
 
CONCLUSION 
 We respectfully submit that the arguments made for PPACA are at odds 
with three areas of precedent not raised by the parties or other amici curiae.  The 
court below held that Congress could regulate mental activity under the commerce 
power, but it is fundamental that the First Amendment prohibits the federal 
government from regulating beliefs.  The court below upheld PPACA based on its 
assumption that uninsured persons would need medical care at some point and be 
unable to pay for it, but it is fundamental that the government cannot allocate 
benefits or burdens based upon arbitrary and irrebuttable presumptions of this kind.  
The court below upheld PPACA on the theory that inactivity amounted to 
commercial activity, neglecting precedent indicating that Due Process protects 
liberty by preventing the exercise of jurisdiction without an element of “purposeful 
availment.”  We respectfully suggest that precedent in these three areas provides a 
telling indication that Congress exceeded its authority when it enacted the PPACA.  
For these reasons, we respectfully suggest that the decision below is wrong and 
must be reversed.   
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Respectfully submitted this 25
th
 day of May 2011. 
 
  /s/ Patrick T. Gillen    
Patrick T. Gillen 
Fidelis Center for Law & Policy 
1025 Commons Circle 
Naples, FL 34119 
Phone:    734-355-4728 
Fax:         312-276-5129 
E-mail:    ptgillen@fidelis.org 
Attorney for CatholicVote.org 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I certify that on this 25
th
 day of May 2011, I filed this document by means of the 
Court‟s ECF system and thereby served it upon parties of record pursuant to, and 
as required by, this courts rules: 
  
  
  
  /s/ Patrick T. Gillen    
Patrick T. Gillen 
Fidelis Center for Law & Policy 
1025 Commons Circle 
Naples, FL 34119 
Phone:    734-355-4728 
Fax:         312-276-5129 
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Attorney for Darrel Rundus 
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